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"GREEN RIVER ORDINANCES": WHERE DOES
THE BURDEN BELONG?
Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr. *
I. Introduction
It has been observed that municipal ordinances are the most volu-
minous types of legislative barrier to free markets in our economy,'
and that of all such ordinances, those that operate most heavily
against non-residents of a community are Green River ordinances. 2
Another commentator has noted that until Green River ordinances
came along, every local burden on interstate direct-to-consumer sell-
ing had been declared invalid. 3 What are Green River ordinances,
and what is their importance in history and in modern America? The
term is derived from an ordinance adopted in Green River, Wyoming,
in November, 1931.4 The measure declared the practice of going in or
upon private residences for the purpose of peddling, or soliciting
orders for the sale of goods without prior consent of the owners or
occupants of the residence a nuisance and subjected such activities to
criminal penalties. 5 The Green River, Wyoming, legislation was the
first of its kind to be involved in litigation6 and was thus the prototype
for similar ordinances enacted by hundreds of other municipalities
during the 1930's. 7 The popularity of-and controversy over-these
ordinances continue to this day.8
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma
1. Mclntire & Rhyne, Municipal Legislative Barriers to a Free Market, 8 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 359 (1941).
2. Id. at 374. The authors also note that "[tihe history of local ordinances
relating to economic affairs traces from the earliest of municipal legislative activi-
ties." Id. at 359.
3. Jensen, Burdening Interstate Direct Selling under Claims of State Police
Power, 12 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 257 (1940).
4. Town of Green River, Wyo., Ordinance No. 175 (Nov. 16, 1931), quoted in
Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112, 113 (10th Cir. 1933), rev'g 60
F.2d 613 (D. Wvo. 1932).
5. Town of Green River, 65 F.2d at 113. See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951) (validity of a Green River ordinance upheld).
6. Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 355, 358 (1954).
7. See Mclntire & Rhyne, supra note 1, at 374 (Green River ordinances were
adopted by over 400 cities between 1935 and 1939).
8. This is illustrated by Tipco Corp. v. City of Billings, 642 P.2d 1074 (Mont.
1982), where it was held that a city could prohibit uninvited door-to-door solicitation
despite state statutes licensing this activity.
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The original ordinance in Wyoming applied to "solicitors, peddlers,
hawkers, [and] itinerant merchants .... ",' But not all. municipal leg-
islation affecting door-to-door salespersons is so inclusive. Therefore,
some understanding of the various labels applied to such persons. is
necessary. As summarized in one excellent article,' 0 three main cate-
gories may be distinguished: (1) Peddlers are those who travel from
place to place carrying their goods with them. They normally sell and
deliver at the same time.". (2) Solicitors are those.who travel from
place to place, or at least house to house but do not carry their wares
with them. They merely take orders for future delivery.' 2 (3) Itinerant
merchants are those who occupy a fixed, but temporary, location, at
which they sell and deliver from stock on hand. They trade in much
the same manner as more permanent establishments.' 3
Over the years, many communities have attempted to restrict ven-
dors in some or all of these categories. ' 4 All, particularly solicitors, are
thought to pose special dangers of fraud and price-gouging to residents
of the community. '5The peddler and solicitor also are often consid-
9. Town of Green River, 65 F.2d at 113.
10. Montgomery, Municipal Regulation of the Itinerant Salesman, 10 OKLA. L.
REV. 37 (1957). But under many ordinances, the distinctions among the various
categories are irrelevant since the ordinances are interpreted as forbidding uninvited
visitation of private residences for business purposes by vendors in any of the catego-
ries. See Town of Green River, 65 F.2d 112.
11. See Wilkins v. City of Harrison, 218 Ark. 316, 319, 236 S.W.2d 82, 83-84(1951). The word "peddler" is said to derive from "ped," which in Norfolk meant a
pannier or wicker basket. Montgomery, supra note 10, at 38. Today this term
generally includes those who were formerly termed hawker, Excelsior Baking Co. v.
City of Northfield, 247 Minn. 387, 389-40, 77 N.W.2d 188, 191 (1956) (the terms
peddler or hawker may be considered synonymous), as well as those sometimes called
hucksters. See Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 203 Kan. 99, 453
P.2d 82 (1969). At one time the word hawker signified a person who wandered from
place to place buying and selling merchandise, often deceitfully. See South Bend v.
Martin, 142 Ind. 31, 40, 41 N.E. 315, 317 (1895). But the implication of deceitfulness
has disappeared with time.
12. See Montgomery, supra note 10, at 38; Upchurch v. City of La Grange, 159
Ga. 113, 125 S.E. 47 (1924). Whatever they are called, these salespersons are usually
agreed to create the most problems. See Montgomery, supra note 10, at 40. Since
they do not have their goods with them for the prospective buyer to inspect, their
transactions are particularly likely to involve fraud. See note 22 infra.
13. SeeJ.R. Watkins Co. v. Salyers, 384 Ill. 369, 374, 51 N.E.2d 574, 577 (1943).
They are sometimes called itinerant vendors, Commonwealth v. Gordon, 354 Mass.
722, 724, 242 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1968), or transient vendors, see State v. Feingold, 77
Conn. 326, 59 A. 211 (1904).
14. Jensen, supra note 3, at 260.
15. See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
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ered irritating invaders of the privacy of homeowners.' 6 When they
come without invitation, they may be regarded as "nuisances" in the
everyday, and possibly also the legal, sense of the term. 17 On the other
hand, much of the opposition to salespersons in all the above-listed
categories may be thought to stem from the regular established mer-
chants of a community.18 Such merchants are understandably per-
turbed at the comparatively "cut-rate" operations of those who lack a
fixed location and/or a continuously operating business.' 9 Whatever
their motives, merchants, and sometimes other concerned citizens,
have frequently been successful in obtaining passage of legislation of
the Green River-type. How have such measures fared in the courts
during their more than 50 years of existence?
II. Issues
A. Due Process v. Police Power
One issue often raised is whether Green River ordinances are a valid
exercise of the police power, 20 or whether they constitute a taking of
private property without due process. 21 The United States Supreme
16. Jensen, supra note 3, at 264.
17. Id. at 263.
18. Id. at 260.
19. These merchants generally have substantial fixed costs, such as rent. Id. They
must pay property taxes on their business properties and pay large numbers of
employees on a year-round basis. Id.
20. City of Alexandria v. Jones, 216 La. 923, 45 So. 2d 79 (1950) (question
presented to the court was the power of a municipality to enact a Green River
ordinance); McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P.2d 969 (1940) (issue
raised in case was that an enactment of a Green River ordinance was not a valid
exercise of police power); Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456
(1936) (court considered town's right to enact a Green River ordinance), appeal
dismissed, 300 U.S. 638 (1937). The original meaning of police power denotes the
power of the government to govern men and things. 6 MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.02, at 419 (rev. 3d ed. 1980). It is the power necessary
for the effective conduct and maintenance of government. Id. at 420.
21. But several earlier cases had found that Green River ordinances have no
connection with a police power purpose and are thus an infringement on home
solicitors' right to conduct a lawful business. One decision stressed that there is no
substantial involvement of the interests of the general public, because a bothersome
home solicitation is at most an annoyance to the individual homeoccupier. See White
v. Town of Culpeper, 172 Va. 630, 635-36, 1 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1939). Another
opinion merely stated there was no relation to public health, safety, or general
welfare. See Jewel Tea Co. v. Town of Bel Air, 172 Md. 536, 192 A. 417 (1937).
Finally, some authorities balance the householder's right of privacy with the solici-
tor's right to earn a living and find that protection of the former is not sufficient
justification for so severe a restriction on the latter. See DeBerry v. City of La
Grange, 62 Ga. App. 74, 8 S.E.2d 146 (1940). It had been observed that mere
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
Court has found no violation of due process22 and it may be urged that
the Court's opinion should put this argument to rest. 23 In any case,
most other courts have agreed. It has been said that the authority to
restrict peddling on private residential premises is inherently within
the police power2 4 and that such regulation has a real and substantial
relationship to the public safety and general welfare. 25 In citing spe-
cific justifications for these laws, a court may allude to the protection
of homeowners from annoyance or disturbance and declare that there
is no constitutionally guaranteed right in uninvited visitation on the
part of peddlers and solicitors. 26 But more often, courts will cite the
need to protect prospective purchasers from fraud. One court ob-
served that many frauds "are perpetrated upon unsuspecting house-
wives by strange peddlers in the sale of their shoddy goods, and many
fraudulent schemes are worked upon housewives by strange solicitors,
who allow discounts for cash payments in full and keep the money
and do not send in the orders."' 27 Due process objections have uni-
protection of homeowners' property values cannot justify a Green River-type exercise
of the police power, at least in the absence of some compelling public necessity. New
Jersey Good Humor, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 124 N.J.L. 162, 169-70, 11 A.2d 113,
118 (1940).
22. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (discussed at note 5 supra).
23. See Note, Constitutional Law-Ordinance Prohibiting as a Nuisance Solicita-
tion by Non-Resident Salesmen, 5 ARK. L. REV. 429, 431 (1951).
24. Alabama Law Enforcement Officers, Inc. v. City of Anniston, 272 Ala. 319,
131 So. 2d 897 (1961) (under police power, municipality could declare both unin-
vited door-to-door solicitation and unwanted telephone solicitation to be nuisances).
See also ex parte Lewis, 141 Tex. Crim. 83, 147 S.W.2d 478 (1941) (ordinance
regulating peddlers, solicitors and transient vendors was valid exercise of city's inher-
ent and statutory police power); Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d
112 (10th Cir. 1933) (discussed at note 10 supra) (regulation of peddlers, itinerant
merchants and transient vendors recognized as subject of police power).
25. Village of West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 119-20, 205 N.E.2d
382, 387 (1965). In addition, the court held that a Green River ordinance would be
valid even if it conflicted with state statutes authorizing municipalities to license
solicitors since such statutes are not general laws but purport only to grant legislative
power to, and limit legislative power of, municipalities to adopt and enforce certain
police regulations. Id. at 118, 205 N.E.2d at 386.
26. See Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456 (1936), appeal
dismissed, 300 U.S. 638 (1937) and authorities cited therein. The prevention of noise
and disturbances has also been cited as a justification for Green River ordinances, see
id.; Rowe v. City of Pocatello, 70 Idaho 343, 352-53, 218 P.2d 695, 701 (1950), as has
the prevention of criminals using "solicitation" as a device to determine whether the
occupant is at home. DeBerry v. City of La Grange, 62 Ga. App. 74, 82, 8 S.E.2d
146, 152 (1940).
27. City of Shreveport v. Cunningham, 190 La. 481, 489, 182 So. 649, 651
(1938). See Hall Omar Baking Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 344 Mass.
695, 184 N.E.2d 344 (1962) (purpose of a Green River ordinance was prevention of
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formly been rejected in cases challenging Green River-type restrictions
on solicitation of magazine subscriptions. 28 The Uniform Consumer
Credit Code also provides protection, within the terms of its coverage,
against fraudulent home solicitation sales by providing for a buyer's
right to cancel within a specified period of time.29
Municipalities are, of course, entities of limited governmental
power. 30 The authority to pass a Green River-type ordinance must, as
with any ordinance, be found in some grant from the state:3' in the
state constitution or in a statute; 32 or, in the case of a home-rule city,
in the home-rule charter. 33 Because there is no dispute as to the state's
fraud); Michaud v. State, 163 Neb. 674, 80 N.W.2d 888 (1957) (object of a Green
River ordinance was to protect public against fraud). In regard to the validity of a
community's Green River ordinance, it has been held that evidence is admissible that
the community is a stopping-off place for vagrant salespersons who are often finan-
cially irresponsible and who may practice frauds on the unwary. Green v. Town of
Gallup, 46 N.M. 71, 73-74, 120 P.2d 619, 620 (1942).
28. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 728 (1950).
29. U.C.C.C. § 2.502 (1968). A "home solicitation sale," to which the special
right of cancellation applies, is defined in § 2.501 of the Code as a consumer credit
sale which meets certain further requirements. The U.C.C.C. has disclosure require-
ments for all consumer credit sales. See id. §§ 2.301-.312. Some of the states that
have adopted the U.C.C.C. in general and the previously noted sections in particu-
lar, include: (1) Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-2-301 to -312, 5-2-501 to -502
(1974 & Supp. 1982); (2) Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 28-32-301 to -312, 28-32-501 to -502
(1980 & Supp. 1982); (3) Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.5-2-301 to -312, 24-4.5-2-
501 to -502 (Burns 1982); (4) Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. §§ 537.3201-.3212, 5.37.3501
(West Supp. 1982); (5) Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16a-3-201 to -206 (1981); (6)
Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, 88 3-201 to -205, 3-501 to -502 (1980 & Supp.
1982-1983); (7) Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 2-301 to -313, 2-501 to -
502 (West 1983); (8) South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-2-301 to -306, 37-2-501
to -502 (Law Co-op 1976 & Supp. 1982); (9) Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-2-301 to
-313, 70B-2-501 to -502 (1980); (10) Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 422.301-.307
(West 1974 & Supp. 1982). See Miller, Living with Both the UCCC and Regulation
Z, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1973) (relationship between §§ 2.301-312, .501-502 and
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691f (1976)); Miller & Warren,
A Report on the Revision of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 1
(1974) (purpose of the U.C.C.C. and changes therein since original was drafted).
30. Traditionally, the scope of municipal power is determined by the use 'of
"Dillon's Rule" which takes its name from J. DILLON, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 55, at 173 (2d ed. 1873) and which states that a municipality "can exercise
the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second,
those necessarily or fairly implied in, . . . the powers expressly granted; third, those
essential to the declared . . . purposes of the [municipal] corporation .. " Id. See 1
C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 5.01, at 5-4 (1982); 2 McQUILLIN,
supra note 20, § 10.09, at 756 (rev. 3d ed. 1979).
31. 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 30, § 5.02, at 5-6; 2 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, §
10.03, at 740 (rev. 3d ed. 1979).
32. 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 30, § 5.02, at 5-6; 2 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, §
10.03, at 740 (rev. 3d ed. 1979).
33. "Home rule" is the concept under which a municipality is free to manage its
own business and conduct its affairs to the fullest possible extent. 1 C. ANTIEAU,
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
ability to delegate police power to municipalities within that state, 34
the basic question of power normally comes down to the above-stated
issue of the scope of the police power. 35 Where a municipality at-
tempts to impose a tax on peddlers or solicitors, a separate question of
power is presented. The authority to tax cannot be inferred from mere
power to regulate, 36 as the latter justifies only a fee sufficient to cover
the expenses incidental to the regulation. 37
B. Overbreadth Arguments
Even if some restrictions on door-to-door solicitation may be justi-
fied under the police power, a particular restriction may be attacked
as overbroad. The overbreadth doctrine is based on the principle of
substantive due process that forbids legislative interference with con-
stitutionally guaranteed freedoms even where some applications of the
challenged legislation would not infringe on any such freedoms.38
supra note 30, § 3.01, at 3-7; 2 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, § 9.08, at 634 (rev. 3d ed.
1979). The main reasons for home rule are: to stop legislative interference with local
affairs and to develop a sense of civic responsibility. Id. at 634-35. The basic source of
power is a self-executing state constitutional provision conferring home rule on
municipalities or legislation passed pursuant to a constitutional mandate. 1 C. ANTI-
EAU, supra note 30, § 3.01, at 3-7.
34. "[W]ithout doubt a state can delegate the [police] power or at least authority
to exercise it to municipal and other governmental agencies of the state." 6 McQUIL-
LIN, supra note 20, § 24.36, at 499 (rev. 3d ed. 1980).
35. See W. VALENTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 343-44 (2d ed. 1980) (noting that
some municipalities enjoy greater delegation of police power than others).
36. "There is a marked distinction between the exercise of taxing power and of
police power." 16 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, § 44.02, at 7 (rev. 3d ed. 1979). "The
authority to levy taxes is not within the police power." Id. § 44.05, at 12. "Since
authority to levy taxes is an extraordinary one, it should never be left to implication.
... It is generally held that the power to tax is not implied from the power to license
occupations." Id. § 44.11, at 28.
37. 9 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, § 26.15, at 24 (rev. 3d ed. 1978). But in some
states, municipalities are given the separate power to tax peddlers and solicitors, as
well as to regulate them. See Town of Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 78, 217 P.
502, 504 (1923). For arguments that either a license fee or tax imposes an impermissi-
ble burden on interstate commerce, see notes 64-76 infra and accompanying text.
38. Conchito v. City of Tulsa, 521 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974);
Marks v. City of Anchorage, 500 P.2d 644, 646 (Alaska 1972). For further discussion
of the overbreadth doctrine, see Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968);
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967), on remand, 290 F. Supp. 244, 250, 257
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd sub nom. and remanded, Golden v. Zwicker, 394 U.S. 103
(1969); Kirkwood v. Ellington, 298 F. Supp. 461, 466 (W.D. Tenn. 1969). See
generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844
(1970). For a discussion of the distinction between the overbreadth doctrine and the
void-for-vagueness rule, see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 110-13 (1960).
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Since constitutionally protected rights to freedom of speech and free-
dom to earn a livelihood are involved in the solicitation-regulation
cases, the argument is frequently made that Green River ordinances
unjustifiably infringe on these freedoms. This argument may fall into
either of two closely related categories.
Under the first category it has been urged with success that the
Green River ordinance in effect prohibits door-to-door solicitation
since the burden of obtaining prior consent is so onerous as to make
such solicitation impractical. On this basis, the ordinance can be
struck down for totally proscribing conduct which at most needs only
to be regulated.39 Where state statutes empower municipalities to
license solicitors, this grant can be taken as legislative recognition that
solicitation is a lawful and useful occupation which cannot be prohib-
ited.4" The ordinance can then be invalidated, not as overly broad
under constitutional limitations, but simply as beyond the scope of
legislative authorization. 4' On either the constitutional or the legisla-
tive basis, the courts are saying that the municipality is using "over-
kill," that it should merely restrict, not forbid, a practice that is not
inherently a nuisance. 42 If distribution of literature or dissemination
of views can be shown to be involved in the solicitation, then the
protection of the first amendment will come into play.43 In such cases,
it is clear that only reasonable regulations of time, place and manner
can pass constitutional muster. 44 However, the argument can also be
made that a Green River ordinance is, in fact, not a prohibition of
solicitation, but merely a restriction of the locations and manner in
39. See Jewel Tea Co. v. City of Geneva, 137 Neb. 768, 291 N.W. 664 (1940)
(ordinance not regulatory but penal and prohibitive).
40. City of Washington v. Thompson, 160 N.E.2d 568, 570 (Ohio C.P. 1949).
41. Id. at 570-72.
42. See Houston Credit Sales Co. v. City of Trinity, 269 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954) (a city has no power to prohibit rather than regulate solicitors,
hawkers and peddlers).
43. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (privilege of freedom of
speech may not be withdrawn even if it results in litter which the community must
remove); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-52 (1938) (ordinance prohibit-
ing distribution by hand of literature of any kind without obtaining permit from
municipal official violates first amendment safeguards).
44. Martin, 319 U.S. at 143; Robert v. City of Norfolk, 188 Va. 413, 49 S.E.2d
697 (1948) (city could enact reasonable time, place and manner regulations as to
distribution of literature but could not deny its citizens the right to circulate, distrib-
ute or buy magazines and periodicals). Cf. ex parte Luehr, 159 Tex. Crim. 566, 266
S.W.2d 375 (1954) (ordinance would be unconstitutional if construed to apply to
missionary evangelist preaching from house to house and taking orders for religious
magazine). For a discussion of time, place and manner regulation, see J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 808-17 (1978).
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which it may be conducted. 45 It has been pointed out that such an
ordinance does not prohibit the sale of goods but merely forbids the
particular practice of home-visitation without prior appointment. 46
Because of these differing ways of answering the question of whether
the Green River ordinance is truly prohibitory in nature, this type of
overbreadth argument has had limited use and success.
The second category takes the form of an assertion that the ordi-
nance covers not only the really bothersome instances of solicitation,
such as cases of dishonesty or of discourteous conduct; but also in-
stances of perfectly proper behavior. Where substantiated by evidence
that most salespersons are mannerly and honest and are welcomed by
homeowners, this argument may be successful. 47 There is difficulty in
justifying an ordinance that makes no distinction between the party
who has the sale of a valuable article at a reasonable price and the
party who is able to present a worthless article and so paint it as to be
able to attract the interest of the general public. 48 Similarly, the Green
River ordinance may be invalidated if it applies indiscriminately to
peddling that disrupts the peace and quiet of the community and
peddling which does not. 49 In these cases, the courts are saying that
only certain practices of solicitors should be forbidden, not the solici-
tation itself.50 No firm line is, of course, possible between these cases
and those discussed in the first category. 51 In this second category, the
conclusion of the courts may again be looked upon as a holding that
only restriction, not prohibition, is justified. For instance, an ordi-
nance that covers solicitation both at private residences and at other
properties may be invalidated to the extent that it covers the "other"
properties. 52 Such an ordinance totally prohibits solicitation rather
than merely restricting the locations at which it may occur, and its
coverage goes beyond the situations of real annoyance: the uninvited
45. See Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process- Freedom of Expression-
Commerce Clause-"Green River" Ordinance as Applied to Door to Door Solicita-
tion for Magazine Subscriptions, 50 MICH. L. REV. 576, 578-79 (1952).
46. See Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 355, 360 (1954), with a list of cases.
47. See City of Orangeburg v. Farmer, 181 S.C. 143, 150, 186 S.E. 783, 785
(1936).
48. Ex parte Faulkner, 143 Tex. Crim. 272, 275, 158 S.W.2d 525, 527 (1942).
49. See New Jersey Good Humor, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 124 N.J.L. 162,
167, 11 A.2d 113, 116-17 (1940).
50. The court in City of Orangeburg, discussed at note 47 supra, was concerned
not with the fact that solicitation was occurring but with the manner in which it was
done (i.e., mannerly, honestly and welcomed by the homeowner). Id. See Faulkner,
discussed at note 48 supra; New Jersey Good Humor, Inc., discussed at note 49 supra.
51. See notes 39-46 supra and accompanying text for the cases discussed in the
first category.
52. See Day v. Klein, 225 Miss. 191, 204-05, 82 So. 2d 831, 836 (1955).
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visit to the home. Business premises are open to all those coming for
business purposes, 53 including solicitors it may be assumed, unless
notice to the contrary is posted. 54
C. Freedom of Religion Arguments
The argument that an ordinance is overbroad because it applies to
instances of innocent and/or constitutionally protected conduct is re-
lated to the argument that an ordinance which restricts activities of
religious groups is an unconstitutional infringement on freedom of
religion. This argument has generally been unsuccessful as applied to
Green River ordinances for a number of reasons. For instance, it has
been noted that these ordinances apply in an equal and non-discrimi-
natory manner to purveyors of religious materials and to distributors
of other goods and materials. 55 In addition, such ordinances do not
curtail the free exercise of religion but merely restrict entry onto
certain locations for promotion of that religion. 56 Again, however, the
question would seem to turn on whether the court looks upon the
Green River ordinance as so burdensome as to amount to a prohibi-
tion, or as merely a limited, reasonable time, place and manner
restriction. Sweeping prohibitions of distribution of religious litera-
ture are held invalid as violating constitutional guarantees. 57
53. "[T]hose who enter premises upon business which concerns the occupier and
upon his invitation . . . [are] called . . . business visitor[s]." W. PRossu, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 61, at 385 (4th ed. 1971).
54. Day, 225 Miss. at 204-05, 82 So. 2d at 836; W. Pnosso, supra note 53, § 61,
at 390-91 ("salesmen ... are considered . . . [business visitors] when they come to
a place they have good reason to believe to be open for possible dealings with
them . . .").
55. Ex parte Killam, 144 Tex. Crim. 606, 162 S.W.2d 426 (1942), cert. denied
sub nom. Killam v. Floresville, 317 U.S. 668 (1942). Some ordinances are interpreted
as not covering solicitation for religious groups or causes. See City of Anchorage v.
Berry, 145 F. Supp. 868 (D. Alaska 1956) (ordinance did not apply to door to door
proselytizing); Luehr, 159 Tex. Crim. at 566, 266 S.W.2d at 376 (ordinance did not
apply to evangelist soliciting orders for religious magazine). An exemption of reli-
gious and/or charitable groups can create problems of possibly unlawful discrimina-
tion. See City of Derby v. Hiegert, 183 Kan. 68, 325 P.2d 35 (1958) (discriminatory
classification found). See also note 127 infra and accompanying text.
56. People v. Bohnke, 287 N.Y. 154, 38 N.E.2d 478, 27 N.Y.S.2d 241(1941),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 713 (1942).
57. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (state may regulate time,
place and manner of solicitation for religious causes, but may not prohibit such
solicitation); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (municipal ordinance prohibit-
ing solicitation and distribution of circulars except as permitted by police held void as
to one who distributed literature and solicited contributions in the name of religion);
Donley v. City of Colorado Springs, 40 F. Supp. 15, 19 (S.D. Colo. 1941). CJ.
Zimmerman v. Village of London, 38 F. Supp. 582 (S.D. Ohio 1941) (ordinance
invalid as applied to restrain distribution of pamphlets by Jehovah's Witnesses). See
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D. Commerce Clause Arguments
In addition to arguments based on "taking without due process,"
the overbreadth principle, and freedom of religion, a challenge to a
Green River ordinance can be grounded on the commerce clause. But,
aside from situations in which fees or taxes are levied by the ordi-
nance,5 8 since the decision in Breard v. City of Alexandria5 the valid-
ity of Green River ordinances seems now to be well established against
this line of attack. The United States Supreme Court ruled in Breard
that a Green River ordinance does not discriminate against or unduly
burden interstate commerce and is therefore valid. 0 Even before the
Supreme Court so ruled, it had been held that this type of ordinance
does not conflict with the commerce clause, 6' and imposes no direct
burden, but has merely an incidental effect, on interstate commerce.62
It has been stated often in this context that only undue or discrimina-
tory burdens on interstate commerce are forbidden under the federal
Constitution . 3
The commerce clause argument becomes more difficult, however,
if the ordinance imposes a fee or tax on door-to-door solicitation. The
Supreme Court in Breard dealt only with a police power restriction,
not economic regulation.6 4 But in Nippert v. City of Richmond, that
Court invalidated an annual license tax on solicitors of $50.66 The
Court stated that policy considerations regarding the substantial ef-
fect, actual or potential, of the particular tax in suppressing or bur-
dening commerce must be weighed,6 7 and here found that the tax was
too likely to result in exclusion of or discrimination against interstate
commerce in favor of local competing businesses. 68 Prior to Nippert,
generally Note, Municipal Law-Ordinance Barring Uninvited Transient Vendors
from City Residential Areas, 27 Miss. L.J. 148 (1956).
58. See notes 64-76 infra and accompanying text.
59. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
60. Id. at 633-41.
61. See Commonwealth v. Dunham, 191 Pa. 73, 43 A. 84 (1899).
62. Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456 (1936), appeal
dismissed, 300 U.S. 638 (1937).
63. See, e.g., In re Mares, 75 Cal. App. 2d 798, 803-04, 171 P.2d 762, 765 (Dist,
Ct. App. 1946) (ordinance prohibiting solicitation on any public street or sidewalk
for sale of magazine subscriptions upheld); Borough of Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66
N.J. 350, 331 A.2d 262 (1975); Moyant v. Borough of Paramus, 30 N.J. 528, 545-46,
154 A.2d 9, 19 (1959) (portions of ordinance regulating and licensing solicitors and
canvassers upheld, other portions invalidated).
64. See Note, supra note 45, at 579.
65. 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
66. Id. An additional '/2 of 1 % of gross earnings in excess of $1000 for the
preceding license year was also levied on solicitors. Id.
67. Id. at 424.
68. Id. at 434.
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the Court had invalidated another municipal ordinance which re-
quired payment of a license fee, 6 declaring that the law's expressed
purpose of protecting the public from fraud did not justify a substan-
tial interference with the free flow of legitimate interstate com-
merce. 70 Influenced by these decisions, some courts have, using rather
sweeping language, invalidated municipally imposed license fees on
solicitors, even where the fee was quite small in amount. 71 But some
well-reasoned authorities have recognized that there is a distinction
between a fee and a tax and that a fee reasonably designed to defray
the costs of licensing can be charged to those involved in interstate
commerce if the fee is not discriminatory or unduly burdensome. 72
Thus, it has been held that a fee required by a municipal ordinance
regulating vehicles carrying foodstuffs was not assailable as a burden
on interstate commerce where the fee-money was used to meet ex-
penses of inspection and regulation, and was therefore not a "tax." ' 73
What if the amount charged solicitors is clearly in excess of the cost
of regulation and therefore must be regarded as a tax? It can be
maintained that any such taxation by municipalities is necessarily an
undue burden when applied to interstate commerce since it opens the
door to multiple burdens imposed by a multitude of municipalities.7 4
Because the Supreme Court in Nippert did not flatly rule out any such
taxation 75 even a municipal tax can be, and has been, sustained if a
court finds it not discriminatory or unduly burdensome. 7
69. Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925). The Court
also invalidated the requirement of filing a bond. Id. at 335.
70. Id. at 336.
71. See Olan Mills, Inc. v. City of Nicholasville, 280 S.W.2d 522 (Ky. 1955)
(annual license fee of $50 on each photograph gallery, itinerant photographer, or
photographer maintaining a shop within city limits held invalid); Olan Mills, Inc. v.
City of Elizabethtown, 269 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1954) (license fee of $20 per year
imposed on solicitors for photographs or magazine subscriptions held invalid); Vil-
lage of Bel-Nor v. Barnett, 358 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1962) (solicitation license fee held
invalid).
72. Moyant, 30 N.J. at 544-45, 154 A.2d at 17-18. See Village of Mogadore v.
Coe, 29 Ohio Op. 2d 44, 197 N.E.2d 570 (C.P. 1963) (requirement that solicitors
obtain identification card for $5 fee upheld). Cf. Olan Mills, Inc. v. City of Boga-
lusa, 225 La. 648, 73 So. 2d 791 (1954) (furnishing of $2000 bond and payment of
$50 license fee for each solicitor of a vendor held valid exercise of police power as
against request for injunctive relief).
73. Jewel Tea Co. v. City of Troy, 80 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1935).
74. See Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 429-31 (1946); Taxi's Inc. v. Bor-
ough of East Rutherford, 149 N.J. Super. 294, 312-13, 373 A.2d 717, 727 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1977), aff'd, 164 N.J. Super. 160, 395 A.2d 912 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978); Moyant, 30 N.J. at 550-52, 154 A.2d at 21; State v. Kromer, 34 N.J. Super.
465, 468-69, 112 A.2d 804, 806 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1955).
75. The Supreme Court only ruled against a tax which discriminated against
interstate commerce in favor of local business. 327 U.S. at 434.
76. See Acuff v. Mueller, 93 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Moyant, 30 N.J. at
545, 154 A.2d at 18; Township of Mount Holly v. Omar, 51 N.J. Super. 201, 143
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E. Nuisance Law Arguments
Since Green River ordinances generally declare the forbidden solici-
tation to be a public nuisance,77 another line of attack has focused on
that designation. Public nuisance which, despite its name, is actually
quite different in many respects from the tort of private nuisance,, is
both a criminal and a tort action.79 The key elements in the crime are:
(1) an interference with the rights of the public or community, or at
least of a considerable number of people; and (2) a violation of some
statute or ordinance defining the conduct that constitutes "public
nuisance." 80 The "public" requirement was traditionally taken to
mean that there must be interference with a public right, such as use
A.2d 600 (County Ct. Law Div. 1958); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Town of Huntington, 72
Misc. 2d 530, 339 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1972).
77. See Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933),
rev'g 60 F.2d 613 (D. Wyo. 1932); Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938);
City of Mt. Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 287 Ky. 781, 155 S.W.2d 237 (1941);
City of Washington v. Thompson, 160 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio C.P. 1959); Town of Green
River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456 (1936), appeal dismissed, 300 U.S. 638
(1937).
78. See W. PRosSER, supra note 53, § 86, at 572-73. See generally P. WINFIELD &
J. JOLOWICZ ON TORT 353-57 (W.V.H. Rogers l1th ed. 1979). Some have taken the
view that the distinction between public and private nuisance is less important and
less supportable today than in the past. See G. LEFCOE, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERI-
CAN LAND LAW 211 (1974). Some cases over the years have indicated that a public
nuisance becomes in effect a private nuisance to those specially injured thereby.
Ozark Poultry Prods., Inc. v. Garman, 251 Ark. 389, 391-92, 472 S.W.2d 714, 716
(1971); Frady v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 55 Or. App. 344, 346, 637 P.2d 1345,
1348-49 (Ct. App. 1981); Raymond v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 Or. 629, 634, 488 P.2d
460, 463 (Or. 1971); Roy v. Farr, 128 Vt. 30, 37, 258 A.2d 799, 803 (Vt. 1969).
79. W. PROSSER, supra note 53, § 88, at 583-86.
80. See Reynolds, Public Nuisance: A Crime in Tort Law, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 318,
320 (1978). The legislative definition of public nuisance usually encompasses every-
thing that would have been a public nuisance at common law. Id. at 323. Tort action
for a public nuisance also requires a showing by plaintiff of special harm that he has
suffered, a showing that there has been a substantial and unreasonable interference
with the public and with plaintiff's own enjoyment of life, and some recognized basis
of tort liability. Id. at 320. The first of these additional requirements-the "special
injury requirement"-has caused much difficulty in tort law. Id. at 332. See Frid-
man, The Definition of Particular Damage in Nuisance, 2 U.W. AUSTL. ANN. L.
REV. 490 (1953); Nuisance-Public Nuisance-Suit by Private Citizen, 24 COLUM. L.
REV. 806 (1924). See generally Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L.
REv. 997 (1966). There has been a recent tendency to de-emphasize the criminality
requirement in the tort action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977) now
merely lists the violation of a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation as one
factor to weigh as to the unreasonableness of the interference with a public right. See
W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 851-52 (7th
ed. 1982); Bryson & MacBeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
and Environmental Law, 2 EcoLoCY L.Q. 241 (1972); Wade, Environmental Protec-
tion, the Common Law of Nuisance and the Restatement of Torts, 8 FORUM 165
(1972).
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of a sidewalk, road or other facility.8' Some modern cases continue to
take the view that some disturbance of a public right is needed for
criminal or tort liability,8 2 and that, for instance, a public nuisance
action cannot be brought on the basis of injury suffered on the stairs of
a church.13 But this common law rule is modified in a number of states
by statutes declaring that a public nuisance may exist where a "consid-
erable number of persons" (or similar language) are adversely af-
fected.8 4 Under such a statute, no public right need be involved in
order to establish liability.8 5 Even apart from such statutory modifica-
tions, there is a tendency to relax the "public right" requirement
where a menace is posed to a substantial segment of the populace."
The second (i.e. "criminality") requirement of public nuisance can
clearly be satisfied by showing violation of a city ordinance.8 7 City
ordinances covering, nuisances in general terms will, like comparable
state laws, be interpreted as prohibiting all conduct that causes ob-
struction, inconvenience or damage to the public.8 8 But like the state,
the city may declare something a public nuisance even though it was
not such at common law. 89
81. See Reynolds, supra note 80, at 320-22.
82. See Conlon v. Town of Farmington, 29 Conn. Supp. 230, 280 A.2d 896
(Super. Ct. 1971); Mandel v. Pivnick, 20 Conn. Supp. 99, 125 A.2d 175 (Super. Ct.
1956); Stremler v. Michigan Dep't of State Highways, 58 Mich. App. 620, 624-26,
228 N.W.2d 492, 495 (Ct. App. 1975); Smejkal v. Empire Lite-Rock Inc., 274 Or.
571, 547 P.2d 1363 (1976).
83. Cox v. DeJarnette, 104 Ga. App. 664, 123 S.E.2d 16 (1961).
84. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2917 (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE § 370
(West 1970); IDAHO CODE § 52-101 (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.74 (West Supp.
1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:33-12 (West 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 2 (1962);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-10-3 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-803 (1978).
85. See People v. Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 247, 172 N.E. 485, 486 (1930);
Mackey v. State ex rel. Harris, 495 P.2d 105, 107 (Okla. 1972) (disturbance to
neighbors found enough); Ballenger v. City of Grand Saline, 276 S.W.2d 874 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1955).
' 86. See State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 113 (Tenn. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976) (handling of snakes as part of religious ritual declared
common-law nuisance). It has been suggested that the definition of "public nuisance"
might be broadened to include all conduct so endangering social interests that
injunctive relief would be more appropriate than other sanctions. Comment, Injunc-
tion-Usury-Public Nuisance, 19 N.C.L. REV. 586 (1941).
87. See Rodgers v. Ray, 10 Ariz. App. 119, 457 P.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1969);
County of San Diego v. Carlstrom, 196 Cal. App. 2d 485, 16 Cal. Rptr. 667 (Ct.
App. 1961).
88. See People v. McGregor, 65 Mich. App. 747, 751, 238 N.W.2d 183, 185
(1975) (ordinance prohibiting conduct resulting in nuisance refers to public nui-
sance).
89. Lane v. City of Mount Vernon, 38 N.Y.2d 344, 349, 342 N.E.2d 571, 573,
379 N.Y.S.2d 798, 801-02 (1976) (city has delegated legislative power to enlarge
category of public nuisance).
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The problem with Green River ordinances, then, is with the first
requirement: does uninvited door-to-door solicitation amount to a
disturbance to the public or community so that such conduct may be
proscribed as a public nuisance? Some authorities have taken the view
that the forbidden solicitation at most annoys a few individuals, not
the whole community, and therefore can be no more than a private
nuisance, which will justify a tort action but not criminal charges.90
One such case comments: "While some annoyance may be said to
result from a call of a solicitor, he can only be at one place at one time
and such a call cannot reasonably be said to disturb at the same time
an entire community or neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons.""' Under this view, the solicitor's call annoys only the person
on whom the call is made, not the general public.9 2 It is usually agreed
that under state statutes delegating powers to municipalities, as inter-
preted in light of the common law, cities and towns cannot declare
something a public nuisance that does not affect the interests of the
general public.9 3 Thus, one commentator has concluded, "[t]hat the
solicitor's conduct, if courteous and gentlemanly, in soliciting for the
sale of lawful goods is not a criminal nuisance is now well-estab-
lished ."4
It is submitted, however, that the authorities finding no possible
public nuisance in solicitation situations are taking a narrow view of
the matter. Surely the courts can take judicial notice that seldom, if
ever, does a solicitor visit only one residence in a community.9 5 There
is no requirement that a nuisance must simultaneously disturb all
90. People v. Barton, 216 Cal. App. 2d 542, 31 Cal. Rptr. 7 (Ct. App. 1963);
Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938); City of Mt. Sterling v. Donaldson
Baking Co., 287 Ky. 781, 155 S.W.2d 237 (1941); Jewel Tea Co. v. Town of Bel Air,
172 Md. 536, 192 A. 417 (1937); City of Washington v. Thompson, 160 N.E.2d 568
(Ohio C.P. 1949); City of McAlester v. Grand Union Tea Co., 186 Okla. 487, 98
P.2d 924 (1940); White v. Town of Culpeper, 172 Va. 630, 1 S.E.2d 269 (1939);
Jensen, supra note 3, at 274.
91. City of McAlester, 186 Okla. at 488-89, 98 P.2d at 926.
92. City of Mt. Sterling, 287 Ky. at 781, 155 S.W.2d at 237.
93. See Jewel Tea Co., 172 Md. at 536, 192 A. at 417; Kadash v. City of
Williamsport, 19 Pa. Commw. 643, 340 A.2d 17 (Commw. Ct. 1975); White v.
Town of Culpeper, 172 Va. 630, 1 S.E.2d 269 (1939). Another way of phrasing it
would be that a municipality cannot declare an activity a nuisance, when it is not
such in fact. Ace Tire Co. v. Municipal Officers of City of Waterville, 302 A.2d 90,
98 (Maine 1973); Town of Rolesville v. Perry, 21 N.C. App. 354, 357, 204 S.E.2d
719, 722 (Ct. App. 1974); City of Washington v. Thompson, 160 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio
C.P. 1959).
94. Jensen, supra note 3, at 274.
95. On the willingness of courts to take judicial notice of conditions leading to
the enactment of Green River ordinances, see Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 335, 361 (1954)
and cases cited therein.
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members of the public who are bothered thereby.96 It is true the
ringing of one doorbell may, at most, disturb the occupants of one
home. However, a solicitor is likely to ring many doorbells within a
short period of time and may possibly disturb many persons. Further-
more, if the law allows solicitation to occur freely, many solicitors are
likely to be seeking business on the streets of any given city, offering
justification for a Green River-type ordinance.9 7
It has been called "debatable" whether solicitation, if a nuisance, is
a public or private one. 8 It is submitted that it can be both; an
annoyance to the public (which is thus a public nuisance) and a
private nuisance to those disturbed thereby. 9 Indeed, an occasional
municipal ordinance can be interpreted as merely declaring uninvited
door-to-door solicitation a private nuisance.100 But this interpretation
would seem only to ease the way for a private tort action and is a
dubious basis for any criminal prosecution.
Some authority has taken the view that even if the wrong word is
applied to the criminal offense, this should not invalidate the ordi-
nance forbidding the conduct, so long as the municipality does have
the power to proscribe such activity. 10' Thus, it has been suggested
that the unrequested solicitation might better be considered a criminal
trespass, but that use of the word "nuisance" does not void the legiti-
mate exercise of municipal power to prevent disturbances. 102 If power
exists to penalize certain conduct in order to promote the well-being of
the community, it arguably should make no difference that an im-
proper term is used to describe the conduct, so long as the law makes
clear exactly what conduct is forbidden. 103
96. The earliest cases of public nuisance involved obstructions to public highways
which obviously would not disturb all travelers at the same time. See W. PRossM,
supra note 53, § 88, at 584. Nuisances may consist of odors, smoke, dust, etc., which
may drift gradually from place to place. Id.
97. Note, supra note 57, at 150. "An occasional visit by a solicitor or peddler
would certainly not constitute sufficient grounds for such an ordinance, but where
the visits are multiplied they may easily become a nuisance and, as such, can be
regulated by the municipality." Id.
98. Mclntire & Rhyne, supra note 1, at 374.
99. As to the overlap between the two actions, see Robie v. Lillis, 112 N.H. 492,
495, 299 A.2d 155, 158 (1972); Urie v. Franconia Paper Corp., 107 N.H. 131, 133-
34, 218 A.2d 360, 362 (1966); Adams v. City of Toledo, 163 Or. 185, 192, 96 P.2d
1078, 1081 (1939).
100. See Larsen v. City of Colorado Springs, 142 F. Supp. 871 (D. Colo. 1956)
(upholding an ordinance that provides criminal penalties but is ambiguous as to
whether the "nuisance" is public or private).
101. Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 63, 58 P.2d 456, 459-60 (1936),
appeal dismissed, 300 U.S. 638 (1937).
102. Id. at 459.
103. McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P.2d 969 (1939).
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There are cases that take the view that uninvited solicitation is not a
nuisance (public or private) at all, and that any criminal penalty is
inappropriate. This can be argued on the basis that (1) solicitation is a
lawful business, 0 4 (2) any disturbance to the privacy of homeowners
is trivial, 0 5 (3) solicitation does not interfere with the health, peace,
order, or good government of the city, 0 6 (4) the majority of solicitors
are polite, honest individuals whose visits are welcomed by many
homeowners.10 7 But there is no requirement that a public nuisance
(e.g., noise or smoke) disturb all those who come in contact with it, so
long as a public right is infringed, or a substantial segment of the
community is bothered.0 8 It is submitted that a local legislative body
could reasonably find that unrequested solicitation disturbs a great
number of persons in the community, and thus the forbidding of this
activity should, at least, be upheld against arguments based on the
requirements of "nuisance" unless the old requirement of interference
with a public right is applied strictly.
F. Equal Protection Arguments
While not an essential part of a Green River ordinance, classifica-
tions are often found in such legislation. For instance, some ordi-
nances apply only to non-resident solicitors, 09 while others do not
apply to those selling certain specified goods. 1'0 Any scheme of classifi-
cation raises the possibility of violation of equal protection clauses of
federal and state constitutions."' It is agreed, of course, that a city
104. City of Osceola v. Blair, 231 Iowa 770, 2 N.W.2d 83 (1942).
105. See City of McAlester, 186 Okla. at 488, 98 P.2d at 926.
106. See Jewel Tea Co. v. City of Geneva, 137 Neb. 768, 291 N.W. 664 (1940).
107. City of Orangeburg v. Farmer, 181 S.C. 143, 186 S.E. 783 (1936).
108. See W. PROSSER, supra note 53, § 88, at 585 (not necessary that entire
community be affected so long as nuisance interferes with those who come in contact
with it in exercise of public right).
109. Ex parte Hartman, 25 Cal. App. 2d 55, 57, 76 P.2d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 1938)
(citing City of Sacramento, Ordinance No. 166); Tipco Corp. v. City of Billings, 642
P.2d 1074, 1076 (Mont. 1982) (citing City of Billings, Ordinances Nos. 5.20.050 &
.060); People v. Bohnke, 287 N.Y. 154, 159, 38 N.E.2d 478, 479 (1941) (citing
Village of Southampton, Ordinance No. 28), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 713 (1942).
110. Day v. Klein, 225 Miss. 191, 198, 82 So. 2d 831, 833 (1955); State ex rel. Gall
v. Wittig, 42 Wis. 2d 595, 601, 167 N.W.2d 577, 579 (1969).
111. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees that no
state shall deny equal protection of the laws to any person within its jurisdiction.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Classifications contained in legislation must bear a ra-
tional relationship to government objectives. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979); Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976). In addition, certain classifications, such as those based on nationality or race,
are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964).
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may make proper classifications and that an ordinance need not oper-
ate on all persons alike so long as it treats those in like situations
alike." 2 In a case involving a Green River ordinance's exemption of
local merchants with regularly established places of businesses, 113 it
was noted that the classification must bear some rational relationship
to a legitimate governmental objective. " 4 Such an exemption for those
having an established place of business in the community sometimes
has been upheld. Some courts have reasoned that those with such
establishments are easily accessible and are often known to local police
officers." 5 Transient vendors may be considered especially likely,
when soliciting, to use an alleged business purpose as a "cover" for
gaining entry to homes in order to learn of good possibilities for
burglary or larceny which they may later commit and then flee to
another town.1 6 It may also be considered that the annoyance of
uninvited visits is less when the visitors are known, or at least identifi-
able and traceable residents of the community. " 7 But at least as many
cases have struck down exemptions of local businesses, finding no
rational purpose behind the distinction" 8 and/or detecting unjustified
favoritism toward local businesses." 9 One authority has even general-
ized that discrimination against non-residents should be avoided, 20
even though some of the above-cited cases indicate that the "discrimi-
nation" can be successfully justified. Certainly it is true that a mere
purpose of favoring local establishments and discouraging non-resi-
dents will not support a legislative distinction.' 2' On this basis, for
112. Day, 225 Miss. at 205-06, 82 So. 2d at 837 (upholding Green River ordinance
as applied to businesses); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. E.D. Wesley Co., 105 Wis. 2d
305, 315, 313 N.W.2d 833, 838 (1982) (quoting Dane County v. McManus, 55 Wis.
2d 413, 198 N.W.2d 667 (1972)); Harris v. Kelley, 70 Wis. 2d 242, 252, 234 N.W.2d
628, 632 (1975); Dane County v. McManus, 55 Wis. 2d 413, 423, 198 N.W.2d 667,
672-73 (1972) (quoting State ex rel. Real Estate Examining Bd. v. Gerhardt, 39 Wis.
2d 701, 159 N.W.2d 622 (1968)).
113. Tipco, 642 P.2d at 1075.
114. Id. at 1078. Under the equal protection clause, a strict scrutiny test is not
applied to such classifications which do not burden a fundamental right or contain
invidious discrimination against a suspect class. G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 102 S.
Ct. 1137, 1141 (1982); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981).
115. Hartman, 25 Cal. App. 2d at 59, 76 P.2d at 711. At the least, local merchants
can be readily found and questioned if doubts exist regarding the conduct of their
business. Id.
116. Id.
117. People v. Bohnke, 287 N.Y. 154, 159, 38 N.E.2d 478, 479 (1941), cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 713 (1942).
118. Tipco, 642 P.2d at 1078.
119. See Wilkins v. City of Harrison, 218 Ark. 316, 236 S.W.2d 82 (1951).
120. Montgomery, supra note 10, at 44.
121. See Jewel Tea Co. v. Town of Bel Air, 172 Md. 536, 192 A. 417 (1937).
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instance, a requirement that solicitors be examined by a local physi-
cian has been invalidated. 122 Discrimination against non-residents as
to the amount of fee that must be paid (where a fee is required for a
solicitor's license) is particularly hard to justify and likely to be held
invalid. 123
What of exemptions for solicitors or peddlers of specified goods? An
exemption for those offering ice, dairy products or farm and garden
produce has been sustained on the grounds that: (1) the public need
for these goods on a daily basis is great; (2) inconvenience could result
from including solicitors or peddlers selling these products; and (3) the
danger of fraud is not great regarding these commodities. 124 An ordi-
nance applicable only to sellers of specified goods was upheld even
though the legislation was found to list only some of the most common
household items and those most commonly sold door-to-door.12 5 The
court in that case observed that exactness and precision were not
required of the legislation where no arbitrary purpose to discriminate
is shown. 126 Exemption of certain groups of organizations, such as
religious or veterans groups, can also be upheld if a valid policy
rationale exists. 2 7 Thus, classification based on commodities sold or
organizations involved would seem to be accepted rather readily by
the courts if supported by any rational ground or if it is shown that the
ordinance is reasonably inclusive, covering the most common and
most dangerous situations.
III. Where Should the Burden Lie?
Thus, when all the arguments against the validity of Green River
ordinances are considered, there is still a strong possibility of many
municipalities successfully enacting and retaining these laws. The
Supreme Court and most other authorities have found neither viola-
tion of due process 12 nor forbidden interference with interstate com-
122. Moyant v. Borough of Paramus, 30 N.J. 528, 550, 154 A.2d 9, 20 (1959)
(requirement said to have purpose of discouraging the canvassing of business rather
than safeguarding public health).
123. See State v. Schmidt, 280 Minn. 281, 159 N.W.2d 113 (1968); Nafziger
Baking Co. v. City of Salisbury, 329 Mo. 1014, 48 S.W.2d 563 (1932).
124. City of Shreveport v. Cunningham, 190 La. 481, 492-93, 182 So. 649, 652-53(1938).
125. Town of Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 78, 217 P. 502, 504 (1923).
126. Id.
127. In Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 491-92, 206 P.2d 153, 161 (1949),
the rationale was that public policy favored such groups. But see City of Derby v.
Hiegert, 183 Kan. 68, 325 P.2d 35 (1958) (ordinance not applicable to religious,
charitable or community service organizations held invalid as creating discrimina-
tory classification).
128. See notes 24-29 supra and accompanying text.
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merce.1 29 Problems with classifications such as limitations of the laws
to non-residents can be avoided by eliminating such categorization,
still leaving the basic purpose of the laws intact. 30 The "overbreadth"
and "nuisance" arguments are probably the most serious threats to the
laws and will continue to have success in some cases. But the former
can be avoided either by narrowing the practices forbidden by the
laws or by establishing that unrequested solicitation, even if courteous
and nonfraudulent, is a disturbing practice. 31 Similarly, the "nui-
sance" argument rests on the dubious contention that uninvited solici-
tation is not a serious bother to the general public-and the argument
may be defeated by evidence to the contrary. 32 A basic question that
underlies the dispute over Green River ordinances, however, is left
unanswered by all this: Where should the burden of giving or obtain-
ing consent to solicitation lie? Should a homeowner's implied consent
to solicitation be assumed unless he or she posts notice to the contrary,
or should the solicitor have the burden of obtaining consent in order
for his entry onto private property not to be considered a trespass?
The common law has traditionally assumed that a solicitor may
lawfully conduct his business from house-to-house unless the owners
or occupants indicate that solicitation on their premises is prohib-
ited. 133 It has been urged that solicitors should be allowed to rely on
this traditional implied invitation unless conspicuous notice to the
contrary is posted. 134 Indeed, some courts have relied on the common
law rule in invalidating Green River ordinances, emphasizing that
custom and usage imply consent which only the householder may
withdraw, 35 or that uninvited solicitation has been established as a
lawful occupation which a person has a right to practice. 13 The
inference, from custom, of the right to enter the premises may be
considered an application of the general tort rule that custom may
justify what would otherwise be a trespass. 13 The application of this
rule to salespersons (based on the social custom of allowing such
129. See notes 59-76 supra and accompanying text.
130. See 'notes 109-23 supra and accompanying text.
131. See notes 38-54 supra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 77-107 supra and accompanying text.
133. See City of Osceola v. Blair, 231 Iowa 770, 773, 2 N.W.2d 83, 84 (1942).
134. Jensen, supra note 3, at 280.
135. See Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 21, 180 So. 347, 355 (1938); City of Mt.
Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 287 Ky. 781, 785, 155 S.W.2d 237, 239 (1941).
136. See DeBerry v. City of La Grange, 62 Ga. App. 74, 81-82, 8 S.E.2d 146, 152
(1940).
137. See McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922); Fletcher v. Florida Publishing
Co., 319 So. 2d 100, 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd, 340 So. 2d 914 (1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
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persons to enter private premises), permits such entrants generally to
be regarded as licensees, not trespassers, on private' property. 38 There
is even authority that a salesperson entering premises where he has
good reason to think that dealings with him are desired will be classi-
fied as an invitee. 139
None of this, however, explains why the common law cannot be
changed by legislation, as it ordinarily may in the absence of violation
of constitutional rights. 40 A Green River ordinance merely withdraws
any previously given invitation, express or implied, of householders,
and creates a presumption of lack of permission where a prior pre-
sumption of consent has existed.' 4' Of course, if salespersons are con-
sidered to have a constitutional right to engage in unrequested solici-
tation that right may not be unduly infringed. But all occupations are
subject to reasonable restrictions for police power purposes. The ques-
tion then focuses, as in the due process cases, on the reasonableness of
this restriction. 142
An important factor in determining the reasonableness should be
the weight of the burden on either party. The householder's posting of
a notice (even as many authorities would require, a "conspicuous"
notice) would not seem great. This would suffice, at common law and
without aid of a Green River ordinance, to make a trespasser of any
solicitor who proceeded in disregard of the notice. 43 The burden on a
solicitor to obtain prior consent, by mail, phone, etc., is surely much
greater; a burden multiplied by the number of prospects on whom the
solicitor hopes to call.
138. See DeBerry, 62 Ga. App. at 82-84, 8 S.E.2d at 152-53; Malatesta v. Lowry,
130 So.2d 785 (La. App. 1961); W. PRossFn, supra note 53, § 60, at 377. But see
Dunster v. Abbott, [1953] 2 All E.R. 1572 (C.A.), where Lord Denning said, "A
canvasser who comes on your premises without your consent is a trespasser. Once he
has your consent, he is a licensee. Not until you do business with him is he an invitee.
Even when you have done business with him, it seems rather strange that your duty
towards him should be different when he comes up to your door from what it is when
he goes away." Id. at 1574. Those solciting money for charity are usually regarded as
licensees also. Ockerman v. Faulkner's Garage, 261 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. 1953).
139. Austin v. Buettner, 211 Md. 61, 67-68, 124 A.2d 793, 796-97 (1956); Lavitch
v. Smith, 224 Or. 498, 505-06, 356 P.2d 531, 535 (1960); Hartman v. Miller, 143 Pa.
Super. 143, 145, 17 A.2d 652, 653 (1941); W. PRossER, supra note 53, § 61, at 390-91.
It should be noted that the Austin, Lavitch and Hartman cases all involved business
premises, and the same rule might not be applied to a residence.
140. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 4 (1982).
141. See McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P.2d 969 (1940).
142. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
143. See notes 133-39 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of a salesper-
son's status as a business visitor or licensee.
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Each party has a right at common law: the homeowner has a right
to privacy, and the solicitor a right to enter private property in an
effort to earn a livelihood. It is submitted that the homeowner can
more easily meet the burden of limiting the solicitor's right through
notice than the solicitor can bear the burden of obtaining permission
to exercise his traditional right. It is, after all, the householder who is
modifying the normal custom and common law rule. The reasonable-
ness of Green River ordinances may be debated, and has often been
sustained but, considering the burdens that can be imposed on the
parties involved, such ordinances certainly do not seem the most
reasonable type restriction possible.
IV. Alternative and Additional Regulations
A. An Alternative System of Regulations
Regulation of solicitors need not be so burdensome. A system of
registration and licensing can be enacted validly which will be less
onerous on solicitors than the Green River ordinance's requirement of
obtaining prior consent. It is submitted that this less burdensome
system is to be preferred if it will adequately safeguard the public,
especially those who are not often able to journey outside their homes,
from door-to-door solicitation. It seems that such a system does, in
fact, operate as a deterrent to criminal or fraudulent conduct, and a
means of apprehending those who engage in such conduct by provid-
ing law enforcement officers with ready means of identifying solici-
tors. 144 Indeed, the registration and identification procedures would
appear to respond much more directly to the crime and fraud prob-
lems than does the prior-consent requirement.
A registration and licensing system does not appear to have any
constitutional infirmities. It has been ruled that a licensing require-
ment 145 imposed by a municipality does not unduly burden interstate
commerce, but has only an incidental effect thereon. 14 The whole
144. See Mogolefsky v. Schoem, 50 N.J. 588, 236 A.2d 874 (1967) (the permit that
the solicitor must carry affords a ready means of identifcation to police in the
solicitation area and assurance to the householder that the permitee has been
screened and approved).
145. Such requirements include the taking of a solicitor's fingerprints and photo-
graph as prerequisite to the issuance of a license. See Mogolefsky v. Schoem, 50 N.J.
588, 236 A.2d 874 (1967).
146. Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 US. 416, 425 (1946); Budget Mktg., Inc.
v. Commonwealth ex rel. Stephens, 587 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Ky. 1979), appeal dis-
missed, 446 U.S. 901 (1980); Borough of Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66 N.J. 350, 360,
331 A.2d 262, 268 (1975); Moyant v. Borough of Paramus, 30 N.J. 528, 545, 154
A.2d 9, 18 (1959). But see Pictorial Review Co. v. City of Alexandria, 46 F.2d 337
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system of registration is primarily intended as a safeguard against
criminal activity by solicitors. 147 As discussed previously, a license fee
or tax may raise more serious questions of infringement on federal
power over interstate commerce. 48 But even so, a fee covering the
cost of the licensing, if reasonable in amount and not discriminatory
in effect, quite likely will be sustained. 149 Where exceptions are con-
tained in the registration-requirement law, the legislation might
sometimes be successfully attacked on equal protection grounds, just
as with Green River ordinances. However, a requirement applicable
to all those intending to solicit within a city, whether or not they are
residents, may be sustained against charges of unreasonable discrimi-
nation.15 0
The scope of a municipal licensing scheme would be limited by the
rule that any delegation of power by the city's legislative body to an
officer or group must be accompanied by adequate standards to guide
the exercise of that power.' 5' This is considered essential in order to
prevent arbitrary governmental action, allow for adequate judicial
review, and inform interested citizens of the requirements for obtain-
ing a license. 15 Thus, the grant of authority to a city police chief, for
example, to award or deny solicitors' licenses must be limited by some
reasonably definite criteria. Numerous cases have struck down delega-
(W.D. La. 1930) (requiring permit of those engaged in interstate commerce held
unreasonable restriction).
147. See ex parte Albrecht, 25 Cal. App. 2d 750, 76 P.2d 713 (Dist. Ct. App.
1938).
148. See notes 64-76 supra and accompanying text.
149. See City of Miami Beach v. Kaiser, 213 So. 2d 449, 453-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1968) (fee of $2.20 for each machine involved imposed on distributors of coin
operated laundry machines held reasonable); Mister B's Bar and Lounge, Inc. v. City
of Louisville, 630 S.W.2d 564, 567-68 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (license fee of $250
sufficient only to compensate municipality for issuing license); Phillips v. Borough of
Folcroft, 44 Pa. Commw. 83, 86, 403 A.2d 194, 196 (Commw. Ct. 1979) (license fee
invalid if it is grossly disproportionate to municipality's cost of regulating a business).
Compare Moyant, 30 N.J. at 546-47, 154 A.2d at 18-19 (fee designed to defray costs
could be charged for license, but $25 fee for six months found excessive). Cf. Village
of Bel-Nor v. Barnett, 358 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1962) (fee of $15 for 90 days held to be
an undue burden on interstate commerce).
150. See City of Washburn v. Ellquist, 242 Wis. 609, 615-616a, 9 N.W.2d 121,
124, reh'g denied, 242 Wis. 609, 615-616a, 10 N.W.2d 292 (1943) (ordinance requir-
ing registration for any person, resident and non-resident alike, engaged in house-to-
house solicitation upheld).
151. Melbourne Corp. v. Hearing Bd. on Denial or Revocation of Licenses for
Nursing Homes, Sheltered Care Homes and Homes for the Aged, 14 Ill. App. 3d 589,
302 N.E.2d 729 (App. Ct. 1973), afJ'd, 59 Ill. 2d 409, 322 N.E.2d 481 (1974);
DePetrillo v. Coffey, 118 R.I. 519, 376 A.2d 317 (1977); State ex rel. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co. v. Wahner, 25 Wis.2d 1, 130 N.W.2d 304 (1964).
152. See 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 30, § 5.33, at 5-96.
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tions of power that left the granting or denying of a license to some
officer's uncontrolled discretion, 53 and it has been held insufficient to
specify that the officer must be "satisfied."' 4 Some specific standards
are needed. 155 But in practice, the specificity required is often not too
great. For example, in People v. Mobin'56 the police chief had the
power to deny a permit if the applicant's moral character and business
responsibility were unsatisfactory. 15 7 The court upheld the ordinance
because the police chief's decision could be made only on the basis of
objective facts.15 8 In addition the courts generally will presume that a
public official will perform his or her duty in a fair and lawful
manner and will not act arbitrarily.159 But a delegation totally lacking
in standards or limitations will certainly be invalidated, 60 as will any
grant of power, that makes a constitutionally protected right depen-
dent on the unfettered will of an official or group. 16 Therefore the
pitfall of "undue delegation of power" can be avoided easily if legisla-
tion prescribes adequate standards.
153. Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1970); People v. Fogelson, 21
Cal. 3d 158, 167, 577 P.2d 677, 682, 145 Cal. Rptr. 542, 547 (1978); Flesch v.
Metropolitan Dade County, 240 So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); State ex
rel. Gall v. Wittig, 42 Wis. 2d 595, 610, 167 N.W.2d 577, 584 (1969).
154. Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184, 1186 (2d Cir. 1971); City of Rockford v. Hey,
366 Ill. 526, 9 N.E.2d 317 (1937); Itzen & Robertson, Inc., v. Board of Health of
Oakland, 89 N.J. Super. 374, 382-83, 215 A.2d 60, 65 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1965),
afJ'd, 92 N.J. Super. 241, 222 A.2d 769 (1966).
155. Tillberg v. Township of Kearny, 103 N.J. Super. 324, 331, 247 A.2d 161, 164
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968); Gross v. Allan, 37 N.J. Super. 262, 267-68, 117 A.2d
275, 278 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955).
156. People v. Mobin, 237 Cal. App. 2d 115, 46 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Dist. Ct. App.
1965).
157. Id.
158. 237 Cal. App. 2d at 119, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
159. Sandblom v. Corbin, 125 Ariz. 178, 187, 608 P.2d 317, 324 (Ct. App. 1980);
Jones v. Scheduled Skyways, Inc., 1 Ark. App. 44, 49, 612 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Ct.
App. 1981); Nichols v. Council on Judicial Complaints, 615 P.2d 280, 286 (Okla.
1980).
160. Stroud v. City of Aspen, 188 Colo. 1, 7, 532 P.2d 720, 723 (Colo. 1975)
(leasing of city facilities improper delegation of power to city manager without any
standards spelled out); City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764,
768 (Fla. 1975) (rent control ordinance defective due to delegation of power without
sufficient objective guidelines); City of South Euclid v. Glazer, 43 Ohio Misc. 9, 11,
332 N.E.2d 780, 781 (S. Euclid Mun. Ct. 1974) (ordinance invalid for failure to
prescribe any standards of guidance).
161. See Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (invalidating an ordinance
prohibiting solicitation of city residents to become members of any organization
which required dues of its members without first applying for and receiving from the
mayor and council a permit, which they had the discretion to grant or refuse);
Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1217 (7th Cir. 1980) (ordinance subsection
requiring adult bookstore license invalid due to city authorities' overbroad discretion
to impose prior restraint on constitutionally protected speech); Basiardanes v. City of
1983]
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B. An Additional System of Regulation
Certain problems connected with solicitation may, of course, call
for more stringent control than that provided by a mere registration
and licensing system. For instance, many communities have, because
of perceived dangers of fraud, imposed special restrictions on solicita-
tion of funds for charitable, political, and similar causes. 162 This type
of solicitation often is not within the typical Green River ordinance16 3
and a different kind of control is sometimes considered desirable here.
For example, a number of communities have attempted to limit the
amount of money collected by charities that can be used for adminis-
trative expenses, assuring that the bulk of the funds are actually
devoted to charitable purposes.6 4 The basic power of a municipality
to enact such an ordinance has been recognized. 6 5 But, where chal-
lenged, such ordinances have often been invalidated on a variety of
constitutional grounds. The United States Supreme Court struck
down one ordinance that did not sufficiently define such terms as
"recognized charitable cause" and "federal, state, county, or munici-
pal cause."' Some courts view limitations on the cost of collection as
overbroad and not reasonably related to the alleged aim of preventing
fraud or violence by solicitors. 167 It has been noted that the work of
many organizations which solicit for funds involves informative and/
or persuasive speech and is thus clearly within first amendment pro-
Galveston, 514 F. Supp. 975, 978 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 1981), aJf'd in part, rev'd in part,
682 F.2d 1203 (1982) (court noted that licensing provision of zoning ordinance
represents prior restraint of speech under system lacking minimum procedural safe-
guards).
162. See National Found. v. City of Ft. Worth, 307 F. Supp. 177, 182 (N.D. Tex.
1967), aff'd, 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970) ("if the
gates were thrown wide open for solicitations . . . by all comers in the name of
charity. . . . [t]he public would be over solicited and a person wishing to make a
donation would have no way of knowing the bona fide charities from the preda-
tors").
163. See MacLeod v. City of Los Altos, 182 Cal. App. 2d 364, 6 Cal. Rptr. 326
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (ordinance prohibiting door-to-door soliciting of business did
not apply to soliciting for political party).
164. Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980);
National Found. v. City of Ft. Worth, 307 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Tex. 1967), aff'd, 415
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970); Carolina Action v.
Pickard, 420 F. Supp. 310 (W.D.N.C. 1976).
165. National Found., 307 F. Supp. at 177 (ordinance limited cost of solicitation
of charitable contributions within city to 20% of amount collected upheld).
166. Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (additionally,
ordinance did not sufficiently specify what those within its reach must do to comply).
167. Village of Schaumberg, 444 U.S. at 620; Carolina Action, 420 F. Supp. at
310 (limitation unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied to political organi-
zation).
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tection.' 68 In any case, even assuming that special restrictions on
charitable solicitors may sometimes be necessary and lawful, such
restrictions are clearly not appropriate and not normally encountered
in the commercial solicitation situations with which Green River
ordinances chiefly deal.
It is also true that a municipality has broad powers to limit use of
public streets and ways in order to protect the public safety and
prevent congestion. 6 9 Thus, a prohibition of sale of magazine sub-
scriptions in a congested business district can be upheld as within local
discretion and at most, as an inconsequential burden on interstate
commerce. 170 Some communities had enacted laws in the past, aimed
at suppression of "pullers-in" 171 who conduct solicitation in front of
stores. The validity of these measures had been held a valid exercise of
the police power, aimed at assuring unobstructed use of public
ways.' 72 Some doubted whether such measures could have validly
been applied to private property, such as the entranceways or door-
ways of buildings, 173 but one tribunal supported even that applica-
tion.' 74 In the past, some courts drew a fairly firm distinction between
distribution of commercial matter on public streets which could be
severely restricted or even prohibited 175 and non-commercial matter,
168. Village of Schaumberg, 444 U.S. at 632 (solicitation said to be characteristi-
cally intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech); New York City
Unemployed & Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 677 F.2d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1982);
Conlon v. City of North Kansas City, 530 F. Supp. 985, 987 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
169. Hamer v. Musselwhite, 376 F.2d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 1967); Gillam v.
Landrieu, 455 F. Supp. 1030, 1037 (E.D. La. 1978); Hill v. City of Lawrence, 2
Kan. App. 2d 457, 461, 582 P.2d 1155, 1159 (Ct. App. 1978).
170. Slater v. City of El Paso, 244 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Slater v.
Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153 (1949).
171. "Pullers-in" are persons involved in enticing customers into stores. See Dinino
v. Valentine, 54 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1939).
172. Dinin6 v. Valentine, 54 N.Y.S.2d 800; People ex rel. Crennan v. Patrick, 171
Misc. 705, 14 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Magis. Ct. 1939); City of Portland v. Stevens, 180 Or.
514, 178 P.2d 175 (1947).
173. See McKay Jewelers, Inc. v. Bowron, 19 Cal. 2d 595, 122 P.2d 543 (1942)
(striking down an ordinance applying to entrances, hallways or doorways of places of
business); People v. Realmato, 294 N.Y. 45, 60 N.E.2d 201 (1945) (finding a "puller-
in" ordinance inapplicable to the passageway leading to a shop); cf. In re Webb, 51
Okla. Crim. 267, 1 P.2d 416 (1931) (ruling that city may prohibit soliciting of
patronage in public places, but not such soliciting in private places). Compare, with
city power in this regard, the power of owners of housing projects or apartment
houses, who are generally allowed to restrict soliciting within the confines of their
buildings but not in public or quasi-public areas. See Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 1431
(1949).
174. People v. Phillips, 147 Misc. 11, 263 N.Y.S. 158 (Ct. Sp. Sess. 1933) (ordi-
nance applied to entrance or hallway of buildings within designated area of city).
175. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (prohibition on distribution
of commercial advertising matter on streets upheld). Cf. Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
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the distribution of which was held to come within the first amend-
ment and could thus not be totally forbidden. 76 In recent years, the
United States Supreme Court has extended first amendment protec-
tion to advertising and other commercial matter,177 though it has
recognized that such speech has a special character and is subject to
reasonable "time, place, and manner" restrictions. 78 Total prohibi-
tions or severe restrictions on dissemination of either commercial or
non-commercial matter, in recent times, often have been invali-
dated. 79 But even assuming that reasonable regulations of distribu-
319 U.S. 105 (1943) (state may not prohibit distribution of handbills on streets in
pursuit of religious activity merely because the handbills invite purchase of books).
176. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (dissemination of religious
literature involved). But cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), upholding
a statute forbidding children under a certain age from selling in public places, even
as applied to distribution or religious literature, and making it unlawful for parents
to allow their children to work in violation of the law.
177. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (complete ban on promotional advertising by utility invalidated); Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (total ban on lawyer advertising invalid);
Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (prohibition of any advertise-
ment or display of contraceptives held unconstitutional); Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (prohibition on
pharmacists' advertising price of prescription drugs held unconstitutional); Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (Virginia advertisements of New York organization
engaged in arranging abortions held constitutionally protected). See Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (prohibition on inclusion by
public utilities, in monthly bills, of inserts discussing public issues held invalid). Cf.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state law could not forbid use of
contraceptives, or aiding or counseling as to their use). See generally Elman, The
New Constitutional Right to Advertise, 64 A.B.A. J. 206 (1978); Annot., 37 L. Ed.
2d 1124 (1974); Annot., 10 L. Ed. 2d 1386 (1964).
178. See In re R.M.J., 50 U.S.L.W. 4185, 4188 (Jan. 25, 1982) (advertising by
attorneys may be regulated); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
503-12 (1981) (as regulation of commercial speech, ordinance prohibiting erection of
billboards upheld); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (statutory prohibition on
practice of optometry under trade name upheld); American Future Sys., Inc. v.
Pennsylvania State Univ., 688 F.2d 907 (3d Cir. 1982) (speech entitled to first
amendment protection may be subject to time, place and manner regulations);
Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1219 (5th Cir. 1982) (state and
local governments have freer rein to regulate commercial speech than expressive
speech).
179. Cable-Com General, Inc. v. Crisp, No. Civ. 81-290-W (W.D. Okla. Apr. 22,
1982) (available Apr. 22, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file); Basiardanes,
682 F.2d at 1219; In re Philipie, 82 Nev. 215, 414 P.2d 949 (1966) (ordinance
banning distribution of non-commercial handbills invalid); City of Elizabeth v.
Sullivan, 100 N.J. Super. 51, 241 A.2d 41 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968) (ordinance
requiring permit for distribution of commercial handbills invalidated). Cf. Welton v.
City of Los Angeles, 18 Cal. 3d 497, 556 P.2d 1119, 134 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1976) (city
could not validly punish the selling of maps showing location of movie stars' homes).
But see Cardarella v. City of Overland Park, 228 Kan. 698, 620 P.2d 1122 (1980)
(ordinance restricting sale or display of items identified with drug usage upheld since
such display held not to be "commercial speech"). Cf. United States Postal Serv. v.
Council of Greenburgh Civil Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (upholding a statute,
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tion of literature and other activities on public streets and ways still
may be sustained, for instance, in preventing congestion and/or litter,
this does not lend support to Green River ordinances, which are aimed
at protecting privacy and preventing fraud. Undoubtedly, some broad
powers will continue to be recognized in municipalities to control
their public ways, but the Green River ordinance applies to entry onto
private property.
V. Conclusion
The basic power of a municipality to enact a Green River ordinance
has generally been recognized. But many pitfalls, most of them consti-
tutional, lie in the way of sustaining any such legislation; and, on one
ground or another, many Green River ordinances have been invali-
dated. Arguably, all the legal obstacles to these ordinances can be
avoided by careful drafting in the legislatures and well-reasoned argu-
ments to the courts. But this still leaves the question of whether these
ordinances are the most desirable, most reasonable type of restriction
that might be used. It is submitted that they are not, as they impose an
onerous burden on solicitors where a very light burden on home-
occupiers, posting a notice, would achieve the same result. Other
means of governmental regulation of door-to-door solicitation exist
and have become increasingly popular, such as registration and licens-
applicable to both commercial and noncommercial materials, that prohibited the
deposit of unstamped, mailable matter in a letter box).
Much the same protection of free speech that is connected with the use of public
streets has also been attributed to public areas of company towns, Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946), federal defense housing villages, Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517
(1946) and military reservations, Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972). But
see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (no generalized constitutional right to make
political speeches or distribute leaflets on military reservation).
At one time, it seemed that shopping-center malls would also be treated as public
areas in which full rights of free speech had to be accorded. Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). But
the Supreme Court has now recognized a shopping center as basically private prop-
erty. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). It is, however, still possible, and
permissible under the federal Constitution, for a state constitution to provide that
persons are entitled to exercise rights of free speech and free petition in a privately
owned shopping center to which the public is invited. PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). See generally Schauer, Hudgens v. NLRB and the
Problem of State Action in First Amendment Adjudication, 61 MINN. L. REV. 433
(1977); Note, The Shopping Center as a Forum for the Exercise of First Amendment
Rights, 37 ALB. L. REV. 556 (1973); Note, Shopping Center Picketing: The Impact of
Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, 45 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 812 (1977);
Comment, Hudgens v. NLRB-A Final Definition of the Public Forum?, 13 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 139 (1977).
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ing procedures. These can be drafted to avoid the legal difficulties to
which Green River ordinances have often succumbed. These alterna-
tive procedures are less restrictive of what traditionally has been
considered a lawful, and often desirable, activity. Municipalities may
still be recognized as possessing special powers as to some aspects of
solicitation-control, as where use of public streets is involved. But
where regulation extends to prohibition of, or severe restriction on,
entry to private property, it is submitted that control can best be left
to the owner of that property.
